A1. A General Theoretical Condition for Sustainability
In the text, I claim that ρ>0 in eq. (2) 
The expectation in (A1) can be interpreted as product of debt times state-contingent claims prices summed over all states of nature. Equation (A1) reduces to the standard deterministic or expected value condition
if individuals are risk-neutral or if there is no uncertainty, but not otherwise. 
and taking expectations, (A3) implies
By assumption, the present value of future income,
is finite. Finiteness of this sum implies that the elements in the sum must converge to zero,
Combined with a bound on µ t , this implies
n → 0 as n → ∞, the absolute value of z n will be less than ε for high enough n,
The corollary follows from a dominance argument, since future debt under the policy
The key element in this proposition is the requirement that the government responds to higher initial debt by increasing the primary surplus ( ρ > 0), at least linearly for high debt-income ratios. If the debt-income ratio becomes high (for whatever reason-high interest rates, low growth, or high µ t realizations), the government will then run sufficient primary surpluses to slow down the debt-accumulation process and to satisfy the intertemporal budget constraint. The other assumptions are technical-sufficient, and much stronger than necessary, to make the non-debt determinants of s t small relative to the ρ ⋅ d t term at high levels of the debt-income ratio.
A2. Tax Smoothing under Uncertainty
Barro (1979) argues that, under certain assumption, tax-smoothing implies random walk behavior for the debt-GDP ratio. This section provides an example demonstrating that taxsmoothing in a stochastic model does not imply a non-stationary path for the debt-income ratio. Moreover, optimal taxes respond positively to unexpected jumps in government debt.
Consider the following simple Lucas (1978) exchange economy with government and with cost of tax collection (as in Barro 1979). Consumers maximize
, where c=consumption, A=assets = claims on the government, R = return on government debt, Y = exogenous income, τ = tax rate, and 
If the government were able to borrow on complete markets, it would be straightforward to show that the welfare maximizing policy for "small" values of h would be to issue incomeindexed debt and to stabilize the tax rate at a fixed value at all times and for all states of nature. Therefore, to explain why there are any movements in tax rates, one has to impose restrictions on debt management. Specifically, I will impose the same assumption that Barro (1979) apparently imposes implicitly, namely that the government has to use safe debt with return R t +1 = r t . Consider a marginal change in (τ t ,τ t +1 ) that increases D t +1 and leaves D t +2 unchanged; the first order condition is
It is straightforward to show by differentiating (A1) that dr t /dτ t converge to zero in the limit as h becomes small. In the limit, optimal tax policy is characterized by
where r t = r is determined by E t [(1+ r) ⋅ β(1+ y t +1 )
To examine what this condition implies for debt service, consider the class of linear polices τ t = g + ρ ⋅ d t . Since this class of
For comparison, note that the optimal policy in a hypothetical economy with complete markets will also fall into this linear class (suggesting that the linearity restriction is not unreasonable) with a parameter
(The value v can be interpreted as ratio of income to the present value of income, which is positive because of dynamic efficiency.) Using the lognormality assumption, one has
where (x,σ 2 ) are the mean and variance of log(1+ y t ) . After some algebra, this implies
A3. Description of the Data
Except for the budget surplus s t , the data are based on Barro (1986a ). For 1916 , the series YVAR and GVAR were taken directly from Barro (1986a) , except that an adjustment was made for YVAR in 1925 and 1930 where the values did not match those in Barro (1986b) . The variables were updated for 1984-95 using the methods explained in Barro (1981, equation 14; 1986a, p. 204) and Sahasakul (1986; equations 20, 21) .
The debt series d t is the ratio of privately held public debt (from the WEFA database, The average real return on government debt is computed by averaging the ratio of interest outlays over debt and subtracting the inflation rate measured by the GDP deflator.
Compared to other measures (say, using real T-bill returns), this procedure recognizes that government debt is a portfolio of securities with different interest rates. The measure ignores year-to-year capital gains and losses. But since government bonds are issued and redeemed at par, capital gains and losses should average out to zero for long samples. Even if capital gains and losses do not exactly cancel out over a particular sample, it would still be appropriate to exclude them for estimating an ex ante real rate provided the capital gains/losses are unanticipated. In any case, the values here are not far from estimates of real interest rates that one would obtain from Treasury bill data.
The main data series are attached.
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